Counterfeiting Congestion Control Algorithms

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Desirable CCA properties



Fairness: whether competing applications share network bandwidth fairly

Stability: how stable bandwidth allocations are (or whether performance oscillates)

Utilization: whether network links are utilized efficiently

Desirable CCA properties

Beyond Jain's Fairness Index: Setting the Bar For The Deployment of Congestion Control Algorithms

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ABSTRACT

The Internet community faces an explosion in new congestion control algorithms such as Copa, Sprout, PCC, and BBR. In this paper, we discuss considerations for deploying new algorithms on the Internet. While past efforts have focused on achieving 'fairness' or 'friendliness' between new algorithms and deployed algorithms, we instead advocate for an approach centered on quantifying and limiting harm caused by the new algorithm on the status quo. We argue that a harm-based approach is more practical, more future proof, and handles a wider range of quality metrics than traditional notions of fairness and friendliness.

ACM Reference Format

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1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the networking research community has generated an explosion of new congestion control algorithms (CCAs) [1, 2, 5, 6, 25-27], many of which are being explored by Internet content providers [4, 19]. This state of affairs brings the community back to an age-old question: what criteria do we use to decide whether a new congestion control algorithm is acceptable to deploy on the Internet? Without a standard deployment threshold, we are left without foundation to argue whether a service provider's new algorithm is or is not overly-aggressive

A deployment threshold concerns inter-CCA phenomena, not intra-CCA phenomena. Rather than analyzing the

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outcomes between a collection of flows, all using some CCA α , we need to analyze what happens when a new CCA α is deployed on a network with flows using some legacy CCA β . Is α 's impact on the status quo is acceptable? Our community has traditionally analyzed inter-CCA competition in two ways. which we refer to as 'fairness' and

> Experimental Evaluation of **BBR** Congestion Control

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drop strategy. A filled buffer implies a large queuing delay

that adversely affects everyone's performance on the Internet:

the inflicted latency is unnecessarily high. This also highly

the one way end-to-end delay below 100 ms. Similarly, many

Bottleneck Buffer Size

transaction-based applications suffer from high latencies.

rating point

Amount of inflight data Dinflight

Fig. 1: Congestion control operating points: delivery rate and

Recently, BBR was proposed by a team from Google [5]

a single sender at a bottleneck. If the amount of inflight data

link capacity (i.e., $D^{inflight} = bdp$), the bottleneck link is fully

utilized and the queuing delay is still zero or close to zero.

This is the optimal operating point (A), because the bottleneck

Right is just large enough to fill the available bottleneck

round-trip time vs. amount of inflight data, based on [5]

operating poi

ideal-d Abstract—BBR is a recently proposed congestion control. to completely fill the available buffer capacity at a bottleneck Instead of using packet loss as congestion signal, like many link, since most buffers in network devices still apply a tail currently used congestion controls, it uses an estimate of the drong structure, a filed buffer involves a long structure data available bottleneck link bandwidth to determine its sending rate. BBR tries to provide high link utilization while avoiding to create queues in bottleneck buffers. The original publication of to CUBIC TCP in some environments. This paper provides an online games), which often have stringent requirements to keep independent and extensive experimental evaluation of BBR at higher speeds. The experimental setup uses BBR's Linux kernel 4.9 implementation and typical data rates of 10 Gbit/s and 1 Gbit/s at the bottleneck link. The experiments vary the flows round-trip times, the number of flows, and buffer sizes at the bottleneck. The evaluation considers throughput, queuing delay, packet loss, and fairness. On the one hand, the intended beha of BBR could be observed with our experiments. On the other hand, some severe inherent issues such as increased queuing delays, unfairness, and massive packet loss were also detected The paper provides an in-depth discussion of BBR's behavior in different experiment setups.

I. INTRODUCTION

Congestion control protects the Internet from persistent overload situations. Since its invention and first Internet-wide introduction congestion control has evolved a lot [1], but is still a topic of ongoing research [10], [15]. In general, congestion control mechanisms try to determine a suitable amount of data to transmit at a certain point in time in order to utilize the available transmission capacity, but to avoid a persistent overload of the network. The bottleneck link is fully utilized if the amount of inflight data Dinflight matches exactly the bandwidth delay product $bdp = b_r \cdot RTT_{min}$, where b_r is the available bottleneck data rate (i.e., the smallest data rate along a network path between two TCP end systems) and RTTis the minimal round-trip time (without any queuing delay). A fundamental difficulty of congestion control is to calculate a suitable amount of inflight data without exact knowledge of the current bdp. Usually, acknowledgments as feedback help to create estimates for the bdp. If Dinflight is larger than bdp, the bottleneck is overloaded, and any excess data is filled into a buffer at the bottleneck link or dropped if the buffer link is already fully utilized at this point. If the amount of capacity is exhausted. If this overload situation persists the inflight data is increased any further, the bottleneck buffer gets bottleneck becomes congested. If D^{inflight} is smaller than bdp, filled with the excess data. The delivery rate, however, does not

Axiomatizing Congestion Control

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The overwhelmingly large design space of congestion control protocols, along with the increasingly diverse range of application environments, makes evaluating such protocols a daunting task. Simulation and experiments are very helpful in evaluating the performance of designs in specific contexts, but give limited insight into the more general properties of these schemes and provide no information about the inherent limits of congestion control designs (such as, which properties are simultaneously achievable and which are mutually exclusive). In contrast, traditional theoretical approaches are typically focused on the design of protocols that

(e.g., network utility max tives), as opposed to the ir

> trol protocols, which is ins sider several natural rem vation, loss-avoidance, fai can be achieved within a offs between desiderata, a space of possible outcon ocols;

ira, and Scott Shenker. 20 cle 33 (June 2019), 33 pag

better congestion cont : (as exemplified by the 4, 18, 19, 49, 50]), (ii) th ndliness), (iii) the envi rcial Internet, satellite) nds, latency- vs. bandy s simulation and expen portant for understan sity of Jerusalem, doronz@o u; Michael Schapira, Hebrew si.berkeley.edu.

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al. Comput. Syst., Vol. 3, No

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Stability Analysis of Explicit Congestion **Control Protocols**

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Abstract

Much recent attention has been devoted to analyzing the stability of congestion control algorithms in the context of TCP modifications (e.g., TCP/RED [10], [15], FAST [17]) and new protocols (e.g., XCP [21], RCP [8], TeXCP [20]). The control-theoretic framework used in most previous work is linear systems theory. The analyses assume that the system can be well approximated by linearization, and the linearization is then used to derive conditions for stability using techniques based on the Bode or Nyquist criteria

We show that linearization is not a good approximation when the queue lengths are close to zero Because the goal of several congestion control algorithms is to keep queue lengths small, the linearization turns out to be the most inaccurate precisely in the realm in which a good algorithm would hope to operate. We show, in the context of explicit congestion control protocols like XCP and RCP, that the stability region derived from traditional Nyquist analysis is not an accurate representation of the actual stability region. Using XCP as an example, we then show that modeling the congestion control algorithm as a switched linear control system with time delay, and using new Lyapunov stability conditions can provide sound and more general sufficient conditions for stability than previously derived. For piecewise linear systems with time-delay, the proposed conditions guarantee global stability. We show that the proposed framework can be used to analyze the stability of congestion control protocols in the presence of heterogeneous delays.

Stanford University Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics Report: SUDAAR No. 776. September 9, 2005. This research was supported by an NSF Career award (ECS-9985072). H. Balakrishnan was supported by a Stanford Graduate Fellowship.



Toward Formally Verifying Congestion Control Behavior

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ABSTRACT

The diversity of paths on the Internet makes it difficult for designers and operators to confidently deploy new congestion control algo rithms (CCAs) without extensive real-world experiments, but such capabilities are not available to most of the networking community. And even when they are available, understanding why a CCA under-performs by trawling through massive amounts of statistica

1

performance (e.g., by giving applications poor ratings or finding alternatives). Performance matters not only in the mean, but also in the tail statistics. In response, the research community and industry have developed numerous innovative methods to improve conges tion control, because CCAs determine when packets are sent and determine transport performance [3, 5, 14, 18, 19, 36, 49, 50, 52, 54] A key problem in CCA development is evaluation: how can deve

pers, operators, and the networking community gain confidence any given proposal? Real-world network paths exhibit a wide ange of complex behaviors due to token-bucket filters, rate limers, traffic shapers, network-laver packet schedulers with various rtifacts, link-layer schedulers that vary link rates, physical-layer agaries, link-layer acknowledgment (ACK) aggregation, higheryer ACK compression or aggregation, delayed ACKs, and more is impossible even for seasoned engineers to contemplate the omposition of every "weird" thing that could happen along a path. such less model or simulate these behaviors faithfully.

The process of evaluating and gaining confidence with a CCA oday involves some combination of simulation [1, 2], prototype im lementation with tests on a modest number of emulated [13, 26, 39] nd real-world paths [53, 54], and, in some cases, empirical analysis ia controlled A/B tests at large content providers. Simulations and mall-scale tests are invaluable in the design and refinement stages ut provide little confidence about performance on the trillions of eal-world paths.

If one has access to servers at a large content provider, then /B tests are feasible where a new CCA can be tried on a fraction f the users to compare its performance with another scheme. If he measured results of the new CCA compare well, it increases onfidence in its behavior, but still does not guarantee that it will erform well in all scenarios. Moreover, as is likely, the new CCA rill not perform better in the A/B tests for all users. The aggregate esults of an A/B test may hide significant weaknesses that arise in ertain cases. When such cases are identified, understanding the ehavior of a CCA requires going a massive data analysis, which hav be futile because the operator might not have visibility into he network conditions that led to poor performance. We also note hat most of the community does not work at a "hyperscaler" with ccess to such a live-testing infrastructure, yet has good ideas that eserve serious consideration.

In this paper, we propose initial steps to mitigate these issues Ve have developed the Congestion Control Anxiety Controller CCAC), pronounced "seek-ack" or "see-cack". CCAC uses formal erification to prove certain properties of CCAs. With CCAC, a user an (1) express a CCA in first-order logic, (2) specify hypotheses bout the CCA for the tool to prove, and (3) test the hypothesis 1 the context of the expressed CCA running in a customizable, uilt-in path model. The user's ingenuity is useful in expressing the CA and using CCAC to propose and iterate on useful hypotheses thile CCAC will prove the hypothesis correct or find insightful

ntal and theoretical appro-

of both industrial and

part of this work for person

as new congestion control. It is called "congestion-based" congestion control in contrast to loss-based or delay-based congestion control. The fundamental difference in their mode of operation is illustrated in fig. 1 (from [5]), which shows round-trip time and delivery rate in dependence of Dinflight for

tion Con

Companies have deployed CCAs that are not fair



250

200

time (s)

Companies are using new proprietary

CCAs for different applications

D. Caban, D. Ray and S.Seshan. Understanding Congestion Control for Cloud Game Streaming. CMU REU 2020

Videoconferencing

Video streaming

Online gaming

Steady State at Low Bandwidth

Amazon Luna

Ingress Rate

Egress Rate

150

Link Rate

20

sdqW

10

5

Google Stadia

165 170 175 180 185 190 195

time (s)

Ingress Rate

Link Rate

11.5

sdqw 10.5



Mbps



ta was collecte rom these cloud

120 140 160 180 200 220 240

time (s)

Our goal is to reverse engineer CCAs

How do we reverse engineer CCAs? Program Synthesis

Program Synthesis

f(1, 2, 3) = 7 f(2, 3, 4) = 8 f(5, 3, 5) = 8 f(2, 4, 5) = 12 f(5, 15, 10) = 35 f?

Program Synthesis



f(input) = *output*

CCA(*input*) = *output*

CCA(**network signals**) = output



CCA(network signals, **state**) = output



CCA(network signals, **state**) = **new state**





CCA code

tcp_rate_skb_delivered(sk, skb, sack->rate);

/* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue * just like anything else we transmit. It is not * true data, and if we misinform our callers that

- * this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit * connection startup slow start one packet too
- * quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.

if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) { flag = FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

} else flag = FLAG_SYN_ACKED; tp->retrans_stamp = 0;

if (!fully_acked) break

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una);

next = skb rb next(skb); if (unlikely(skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NU if (unlikely(skb == tp->lost_skb_hint))
 tp->lost skb hint = NULL; tcp highest sack replace(sk, skb, next); tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free(skb, sk);

if (!skb) tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO_BUSY);

if (likely(between(tp->snd_up, prior_snd_una, tp->snd_una))) tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una;

if (skb) {

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una); if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) flag = FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;

if (likely(first_ackt) && !(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) { seq_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, first_ackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, last_ackt);

> if (pkts_acked == 1 && last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache && last in flight && !prior sacked && fully acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && !(flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYN_ACKED))) {

/* Conservatively mark a delayed ACK. It's typically * from a lone runt packet over the round trip to

* a receiver w/o out-of-order or CE events.

flag = FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED;

if (sack->first_sackt) +

sack rtt us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt);

rtt_update = tcp_ack_update_rtt(sk, flag, seq_rtt_us, sack_rtt_us, ca_rtt_us, sack->rate);

if (flag & FLAG ACKED)

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */ if (unlikely(icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size && !after(tp->mtu_probe.probe_seq_end, tp->snd_una))) { tcp mtup probe success(sk);

if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {

tcp remove reno sacks(sk, pkts acked, ece ack);

/* If any of the cumulatively ACKed segments was * retransmitted, non-SACK case cannot confirm that

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* progress was due to original transmission due to * lack of TCPCB SACKED ACKED bits even if some of * the packets may have been never retransmitted.

if (flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) flag &= ~FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED; } else {

int delta:

/* Non-retransmitted hole got filled? That's reordering if (before(reord, prior fack)) tcp check sack reordering(sk, reord, 0);

delta = prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out;

tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);

} else if (skb && rtt update && sack rtt us >= 0 && sack_rtt_us > tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb))) /* Do not re-arm RTO if the sack RTT is measured from data sent * after when the head was last (re)transmitted. Otherwise the * timeout may continue to extend in loss recovery.

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked) struct ack_sample sample = . .pkts acked = pkts acked. .rtt us = sack->rate->rtt us .in_flight = last_in_flight };

icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample);

#if FASTRETRANS DEBUG > 0

WARN ON((int)tp->sacked out < 0); WARN ON((int)tp->lost out < 0); WARN ON((int)tp->retrans out < 0): if (!tp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) { icsk = inet csk(sk); if (tp->lost_out) {

pr_debug("Leak l=%u %d\n", tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->lost_out = 0;

if (tp->sacked_out) { pr_debug("Leak s=%u %d\n", tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->sacked_out = 0;

if (tp->retrans_out) { pr_debug("Leak r=%u %d\n", tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->retrans_out = 0;

#endif return flag;

static void tcp_ack_probe(struct sock *sk)

struct inet connection sock *icsk = inet csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

/* Was it a usable window open? */ if (!head)

return: if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) { icsk->icsk backoff = 0; icsk->icsk probes tstamp = 0; inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0);

/* Socket must be waked up by subsequent tcp_data snd check().

} else { unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX); when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when); tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0, when, TCP_RTO_MAX);

static inline bool tcp ack is dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open;

/* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */ static inline bool tcp may raise cwnd(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

- /* If reordering is high then always grow cwnd whenever data is
- * delivered regardless of its ordering. Otherwise stay conservative
- * and only grow cwnd on in-order delivery (RFC5681). A stretched ACK w/ * new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce
- * cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states.

return flag & FLAG DATA ACKED;

```
/* The "ultimate" congestion control function that aims to replace the rigid
 * cwnd increase and decrease control (tcp_cong_avoid,tcp_*cwnd_reduction).
 * It's called toward the end of processing an ACK with precise rate
 * information. All transmission or retransmission are delayed afterwards.
```

static void tcp_cong_control(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked_sacked, int flag, const struct rate sample *rs)

const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);

if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control) icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control(sk, rs); return:

```
if (tcp_in_cwnd_reduction(sk)) {
         /* Reduce cwnd if state mandates */
        tcp_cwnd_reduction(sk, acked_sacked, rs->losses, flag);
} else if (tcp_may_raise_cwnd(sk, flag)) -
                          f state .
        tcp_cong_avoid(sk, ack, acked_sacked);
```

```
tcp_update_pacing_rate(sk);
```

/* Check that window update is acceptable. * The function assumes that snd una<=ack<=snd next. */

static inline bool tcp_may_update_window(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const u32 ack, const u32 ack seq,

const u32 nwin)

return after(ack, tp->snd_una) after(ack seq, tp->snd wl1) (ack_seq == tp->snd_wll && nwin > tp->snd_wnd);

/* If we update tp->snd una, also update tp->bytes acked */ static void tcp snd una update(struct tcp sock *tp, u32 ack)

u32 delta = ack - tp->snd_una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp); tp->bytes acked += delta; * This function is not for random using! */ Counterfeiting Congestion Control Algorithms

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq);

/* Update our send window.

* Window update algorithm, described in RFC793/RFC1122 (used in linux-2.2 * and in FreeBSD. NetBSD's one is even worse.) is wrong.

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack, u32 ack_seq)

struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp hdr(skb)->window)

> if (likely(!tcp_hdr(skb)->syn)) nwin <<= tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) { flag = FLAG WIN UPDATE; tcp_update_wl(tp, ack_seq);

> if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) . tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

> > /* Note, it is the only place, where * fast path is recovered for sending TCP.

tp->pred_flags = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk);

> if (!tcp_write_queue_empty(sk)) tcp_slow_start_after_idle_check(sk);

if (nwin > tp->max_window) tp->max_window = nwin:

tcp sync mss(sk, inet csk(sk)->icsk pmtu cookie);

tcp_snd_una_update(tp, ack);

return flag

}

static bool __tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, int mib idx, u32 *last oow ack time)

> if (*last oow ack time) s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time);

if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit) NET INC STATS(net, mib idx); /* rate-limited: don't send yet! */ return true:

*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;

return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */

/* Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and * thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in * response to out-of-window SYNs or ACKs to mitigate ACK loops or DoS * attacks that send repeated SYNs or ACKs for the same connection. To * do this, we do not send a duplicate SYNACK or ACK if the remote * endpoint is sending out-of-window SYNs or pure ACKs at a high rate.

bool tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, int mib_idx, u32 *last_oow_ack_time)

/* Data packets without SYNs are not likely part of an ACK loop. */ if ((TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) && !tcp hdr(skb)->syn)

Most congestion control code is boilerplate $f_{\text{tot top_sock *tp = top_sk(sk)}}^{\text{tot top_sock *tp = top_sk(sk)}}$



CCA code

tcp_rate_skb_delivered(sk, skb, sack->rate);

- /* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue * just like anything else we transmit. It is not * true data, and if we misinform our callers that
- * this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit
- * connection startup slow start one packet too * quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.

if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) { flag = FLAG_DATA_ACKED; } else

flag = FLAG_SYN_ACKED; tp->retrans_stamp = 0;

if (!fully_acked) break:

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una);

next = skb rb next(skb); if (unlikely(skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NUI if (unlikely(skb == tp->lost_skb_hint))
 tp->lost skb hint = NULL; tcp highest sack replace(sk, skb, next); tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free(skb, sk);

if (!skb) tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO_BUSY);

if (likely(between(tp->snd_up, prior_snd_una, tp->snd_una))) tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una;

if (skb) {

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una); if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) flag = FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;

if (likely(first_ackt) && !(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) { seq_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, first_ackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, last_ackt);

> if (pkts_acked == 1 && last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache && last in flight && !prior sacked && fully acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && !(flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYN_ACKED))) {

/* Conservatively mark a delayed ACK. It's typically * from a lone runt packet over the round trip to * a receiver w/o out-of-order or CE events.

flag = FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED;

if (sack->first_sackt) +

sack rtt us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt);

rtt_update = tcp_ack_update_rtt(sk, flag, seq_rtt_us, sack_rtt_us, ca_rtt_us, sack->rate);

if (flag & FLAG ACKED)

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */ if (unlikely(icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size && !after(tp->mtu_probe.probe_seq_end, tp->snd_una))) { tcp mtup probe success(sk);

if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {

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tcp remove reno sacks(sk, pkts acked, ece ack);

/* If any of the cumulatively ACKed segments was * retransmitted, non-SACK case cannot confirm that * progress was due to original transmission due to * lack of TCPCB SACKED ACKED bits even if some of * the packets may have been never retransmitted.

if (flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) flag &= ~FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED;

int delta:

} else {

/* Non-retransmitted hole got filled? That's reordering if (before(reord, prior fack)) tcp check sack reordering(sk, reord, 0);

delta = prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out; tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);

} else if (skb && rtt update && sack rtt us >= 0 && sack_rtt_us > tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb))) /* Do not re-arm RTO if the sack RTT is measured from data sent * after when the head was last (re)transmitted. Otherwise the * timeout may continue to extend in loss recovery.

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked) struct ack_sample sample = . .pkts acked = pkts acked, .rtt us = sack->rate->rtt us .in_flight = last_in_flight };

icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample);

#if FASTRETRANS DEBUG > 0

WARN ON((int)tp->sacked out < 0); WARN ON((int)tp->lost out < 0); WARN ON((int)tp->retrans out < 0): if (!tp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) { icsk = inet csk(sk); if (tp->lost_out) { pr_debug("Leak l=%u %d\n", tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);

tp->lost_out = 0; if (tp->sacked_out) {

pr_debug("Leak s=%u %d\n", tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->sacked_out = 0;

if (tp->retrans_out) { pr_debug("Leak r=%u %d\n", tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->retrans_out = 0;

#endif return flag;

static void tcp_ack_probe(struct sock *sk)

struct inet connection sock *icsk = inet csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

/* Was it a usable window open? */ if (!head)

return: if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) { icsk->icsk backoff = 0; icsk->icsk probes tstamp = 0; inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0);

/* Socket must be waked up by subsequent tcp_data_snd_check(). * This function is not for random using! counterreiting congestion Control Algorithms

return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open; /* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */ static inline bool tcp may raise cwnd(const struct sock *sk, const int flag) /* If reordering is high then always grow cwnd whenever data is * delivered regardless of its ordering. Otherwise stay conservative * and only grow cwnd on in-order delivery (RFC5681). A stretched ACK w/ * new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce * cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states.

/* The "ultimate" congestion control function that aims to replace the rigid

unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX);

tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0, when, TCP_RTO_MAX);

when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when);

static inline bool tcp ack is dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return flag & FLAG DATA ACKED;

} else {

```
* cwnd increase and decrease control (tcp_cong_avoid,tcp_*cwnd_reduction).
 * It's called toward the end of processing an ACK with precise rate
 * information. All transmission or retransmission are delayed afterwards
static void tcp_cong_control(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked_sacked,
                             int flag, const struct rate_sample *rs)
       const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
        if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control)
                icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control(sk, rs);
                return;
        if (tcp in cwnd reduction(sk)) {
                   Reduce cwnd if state mandates */
                tcp cwnd reduction(sk, acked sacked, rs->losses, flag);
       } else if (tcp_may_raise_cwnd(sk, flag))
```

tcp cong avoid(sk, ack, acked sacked);

tcp_update_pacing_rate(sk);

/* Check that window update is acceptable. * The function assumes that snd una<=ack<=snd next. */ static inline bool tcp_may_update_window(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const u32 ack, const u32 ack seq,

const u32 nwin)

return after(ack, tp->snd_una) after(ack seq, tp->snd wl1) (ack_seq == tp->snd_wll && nwin > tp->snd_wnd);

/* If we update tp->snd una, also update tp->bytes acked */ static void tcp snd una update(struct tcp sock *tp, u32 ack)

u32 delta = ack - tp->snd_una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp); tp->bytes acked += delta;

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq);

/* Update our send window.

* Window update algorithm, described in RFC793/RFC1122 (used in linux-2.2 * and in FreeBSD. NetBSD's one is even worse.) is wrong.

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack, u32 ack_seq)

struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp hdr(skb)->window)

> if (likely(!tcp_hdr(skb)->syn)) nwin <<= tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) { flag = FLAG WIN UPDATE; tcp_update_wl(tp, ack_seq);

> if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) . tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

> > /* Note, it is the only place, where * fast path is recovered for sending TCP.

tp->pred_flags = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk);

> if (!tcp_write_queue_empty(sk)) tcp_slow_start_after_idle_check(sk);

if (nwin > tp->max_window) tp->max window = nwin; tcp sync mss(sk, inet csk(sk)->icsk pmtu cookie);

tcp_snd_una_update(tp, ack);

return flag

}

static bool __tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, int mib idx, u32 *last oow ack time)

> if (*last oow ack time) s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time);

if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit) NET INC STATS(net, mib idx); /* rate-limited: don't send yet! */ return true:

*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;

return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */

/* Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and * thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in response to out-of-window SYNs or ACKs to mitigate ACK loops or DoS * attacks that send repeated SYNs or ACKs for the same connection. To * do this, we do not send a duplicate SYNACK or ACK if the remote * endpoint is sending out-of-window SYNs or pure ACKs at a high rate.

bool tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, int mib_idx, u32 *last_oow_ack_time)

/* Data packets without SYNs are not likely part of an ACK loop. */ if ((TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) && !tcp hdr(skb)->syn)

CCA code

tcp_rate_skb_delivered(sk, skb, sack->rate);

if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) {
 flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

are the set of the set

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_sn

next = skb_rb_next(skb); if (unlikely(sk) == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL; if (unlikely(sk) == tp->lost_skb_hint)) tp_highest_sack_replace(sk, skb, next); tcp_rts_queue_unlika_df_ree(skb, sk);

tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO_BUSY);

if (likely(between(tp->snd_up, prior_snd_una, tp->snd_una)))) tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una;

/ tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una); if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;

if (likely(first_ackt) && (flag & FLAG RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
 seq_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, first_ackt);
 ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, last_ackt);

if (pkts_acked == 1 &&& last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache &&& last_in_flight &&& !prior_sacked && fully_acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && !(flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYN_ACKED))) {

flag |= FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED;

if (sack->first_sackt)

sack_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt);

f (flag & FLAG ACKED)

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) { tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked, ece ack);

if (flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) flag &= ~FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED;

int delta:

p->lost cnt hint, delta);

tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb)))

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked) { struct ack_sample sample = { .pkts_acked = pkts_acked, .rtt_us = sack->rate->rtt_us, .in_flight = last_in_flight };

icsk_>icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample);

WARN ON((int)tp->sacked out < 0); WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0); WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0); if (ltp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) {

icsk = inet csk(sk); if (tp->lost_out) pr_debug("Leak l=%u %d\n" tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->lost_out = 0;

if (tp->sacked_out) { pr_debug("Leak s=%u %d\n" tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->sacked_out = 0;

if (tp->retrans_out) { pr_debug("Leak r=%u %d\n", tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->retrans_out = 0;

return flag;

static void tcp_ack_probe(struct sock *sk)

struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

/* Was it a usable window open? */
if (!head)

if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) { icsk->icsk_backoff = 0; icsk->icsk probes tstamp = 0; inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0);

unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX)

when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when); tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0, when, TCP_RTO_MAX);

static inline bool tcp ack is dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open;

/* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */
static inline bool tcp may raise cwnd(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return flag & FLAG DATA ACKED;

Event handlers

static inline bool tcp_may_update_window(const struct tcp_sock *tp,

const u32 ack, const u32 ack_seq, const u32 nwin)

return after(ack, tp->snd_una) after(ack_seq, tp->snd_wl1) $(ack_seq == tp->snd_wl1 \&\& nwin > tp->snd_wnd);$

/* If we update tp->snd_una, also update tp->bytes_acked */
static void tcp_snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack)

u32 delta = ack - $tp \rightarrow snd$ una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp);
tp->bytes acked += delta;

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq)

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack, u32 ack_seq)

struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->window)

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) {
 flag |= FLAG_WIN_UPDATE;
 tcp_update_wI(tp, ack_seq);

if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) {
 tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

tp->pred_flags = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk);

if (nwin > tp->max_window) {
 tp->max window = nwin; tcp sync mss(sk, inet csk(sk)->icsk pmtu cookie);

tcp snd una update(tp, ack);

return flag:

if (*last_oow_ack_time) {
 s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time);

if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit)
 NRT_INC_STATS(net, mib_idx);
 return true; /* rate-limited; don't send yet! */

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*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;

return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! *,

if ((TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) && !tcp_hdr(skb)->syn)

Counterrenting Congestion Control Algorithms

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Our 1st goal: synthesize a <u>very</u> <u>basic</u> version of Reno



Two event handlers:

- *win-ack* updates CWND when there is an ACK
- *win-timeout* updates CWND there is a timeout

Network traces Boilerplate code



Some inputs are unknown



Time	ACKs	Sent
1	-	1
2	-	1461
3	-	2921
4	-	4381
5	-	-
6	-	-
7	-	-
8	1461	5841
9	-	-
10	4381	7301
11	5841	8761
12	-	10221

Each timestep takes as input the previous timestep's output

 $h(CWND_0, ACKs_0, sent_0) = CWND_1$ $h(CWND_1, ACKs_1, sent_1) = CWND_2$ $h(CWND_2, ACKs_2, sent_2) = CWND_3$ $h(CWND_3, ACKs_3, sent_3) = CWND_4$ $h(CWND_4, ACKs_4, sent_4) = CWND_5$

...

 $CWND_n = h(\dots h(h(CWND_0, ACKs_0, sent_0), ACKs_1, sent_1), ACKs_2, sent_2)\dots)$

ACKs

. . .

Sent

-

Time

Naïve approach

Candidate h functions:

- $win-ack = CWND + AKD * CWND / x_1$
- win-timeout = CWND / x_2





Candidate h functions:

- win-ack = CWND + AKD * CWND / MSS
- win-timeout = CWND / x_2





Candidate h functions:

- win-ack = CWND + AKD * CWND / MSS
- win-timeout = $CWND x_2$





Candidate h functions:

- win-ack = CWND + AKD MSS
- win-timeout = $CWND x_2$





Candidate h functions:

- win-ack = CWND + AKD * MSS / CWND
- win-timeout = $CWND x_2$





Candidate h functions:

- win-ack = CWND + AKD * MSS / CWND
- win-timeout = CWND * w_0





The search space is very, very large

~20,000 win-ack handlers x ~20,000 win-timeout handlers =

several hundred million possible CCAs

but we cannot do several hundred million solver calls.

CCA synthesis is challenging

Traditional synthesis:

f(1, 2, 3) = 7 f(2, 3, 4) = 8 f(5, 3, 5) = 8 f(2, 4, 5) = 12







CCA synthesis:

Our synthesizer: Mister 880

- 2 main goals:
- Make simpler solver calls
- Decrease search space



Start with shortest trace



Synthesize one handler at a time



win-ack: Updates CWND when there is an ACK

win-timeout:

Updates CWND when there is a timeout

Do not consider functions that cannot be handlers

CWND = CWND * AKDbytes² bytes bytes

The result is not in bytes.

CWND = CWND / AKD * MSS

will never increase CWND.

Reduces search space by ~80%

Mister 880 divides the search into smaller, easier problems

Main ideas:

- Start with shortest trace
- Synthesize one handler at a time
- Domain-specific knowledge

√simpler solver calls

√simpler solver calls

√decrease search space

Simplified Reno

win-ack(CWND, AKD, MSS) = CWND + AKD * MSS / CWND

 $win-timeout(CWND, w_0) = w_0$

Naïve approach without our optimizations did not finish.

Mister 880 synthesized in **13 minutes** on a 2015 MacBook Pro.



Counterfeiting Congestion Control Algorithms



- How can we work from Internet traces?
- How can we synthesize more complex CCAs?

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